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With China’s investment and saving high—in historical context and compared to other 
countries—questions on investment and saving continue to arouse the interest of 
policymakers and researchers. However, knowledge about the underlying patterns of 
investment and saving is limited. This paper attempts to answer the following questions. 
What are the factors driving China’s high investment? How is saving channeled into 
investment? In particular, how is enterprise investment financed, and what are the roles 
of the domestic banking sector, enterprise saving, and the government?  
 
Answers to these questions are important for several reasons. First, they inform the 
current debate on the types of risks and policy challenges stemming from China’s high 
investment, including on what policies are needed to mitigate risks and improve the 
efficiency of capital allocation. Second, they facilitate the understanding of China’s 
pattern of growth. High investment and saving are key features of China’s pattern of 
growth. A better understanding of their determinants could improve the understanding of 
the pattern of growth; its sustainability; and medium and long-term prospects. Third, they 
help identify the policy implications of the projected saving and investment 
developments, also in light of identified tensions and the intended change in the policy 
stance, including the planned shift in government spending from investment to social 
spending and the increased role of private consumption. 
 
To answer these questions, the paper analyzes sectoral trends in investment and saving 
and the resulting sectoral saving-investment balances over time and relates them to 
cyclical and structural developments, to better interpret current developments. It also 
compares these trends to those in other countries to identify China’s special features.  
 
The paper uses—apparently for the first time—time series data from the Flow of Funds 
(FoF) from the national accounts.
1 The advantage of these data is that they reflect 
financial flows between sectors. Moreover, the “above the line” flow data are mapped 
with “below the line” data on financing. The conclusions based on this data are verified 
by looking at data from other sources, including from the financial sector, on the 
financing of investment from the Statistical Yearbook (SYB), and the household survey.
2  
 
This paper does not look into potential problems with data on investment and GDP, 
reflecting a belief that, in addition to any data problems—most of which are pertinent in 
other countries too—there are economic explanations behind the developments on 
investment and saving in China.
 3 
                                                 
1 The FoF accounts show for households, enterprises, the government, and the “rest of the world” the 
sources and uses of financial resources. The “above the line” flows show the composition of income, 
consumption and saving, physical investment, and the resulting net external financing. The “below the line” 
flows show how each sector’s net external financial balance is invested and/or financed.  
2 The FoF data is only available up until 2001, and, for some parts, 2002. Some estimates are made for 
2002 and 2003, but these are meant to be only indicative. For instance, household saving is estimated using 
the year-on-year change in household saving from the household survey. 
3 Data on Fixed Asset Investment in China (FAI) includes land sales. National accounts data on Gross 
Capital Formation (GCF), which does not include such sales, is better comparable internationally.   2
We find that since the early 1990s investment by households and direct investment by the 
government have been relatively steady at levels comparable to other countries, while 
investment by the enterprise sector distinguishes China from other countries and explains 
most of the variation of China’s total investment over time. We also find that high 
household saving explains only part of the difference in total saving between China and 
other countries; the rest is explained by high saving of the government and enterprises, 
the latter particularly in recent years, as profitability has improved. Net external financing 
of enterprise investment—from the banking sector and via net foreign direct investment 
(FDI)—is high compared to other countries but, at about one-third, constitutes only a 
modest part of enterprise investment. 
 
High government saving is the result of a policy favoring government-financed 
investment over government consumption. Reasons for relatively high saving by 
enterprises include a high share of capital-intensive industry in GDP and a traditional 
policy of low (or no) dividends.  
 
These findings lead to three sets of policy implications. First, the financing patterns 
indicate a lower degree of bank financing to enterprises and associated financial sector 
exposure than is usually thought. By the same token, though, against the background of 
concerns about suboptimal allocation of capital, the high degree of financing by retained 
earnings and government transfers bring to the fore issues of (corporate) governance and 
dividend policy, as well as of transparency and accountability of public funds. Second, 
the planned shift in government spending from investment toward social spending and 
the increased role of private consumption can be brought about by reducing the high 
share of government revenue traditionally devoted to investment and changing the policy 
framework away from the promotion of capital-intensive industry. Third, saving is 
projected to decline in the long term, with the speed depending on policy adjustments. 
 
A. Findings in existing literature about saving in China 
 
Domestic saving finances the bulk of any country’s investment. Questions about levels of 
investment are therefore closely linked to questions on saving. The theoretical literature 
on the determinants of saving is rooted in consumption theory and, consequently, largely 
centers on factors affecting households. Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000) 
provide an overview of empirical studies in this area in developed and developing 
countries. Their own cross country empirical work finds that private sector and national 
savings are affected by: 
•  The level of development (per capita income), with the influence of per capita 
income larger in developing countries; 
•  Economic growth, with much of the causation running from growth to saving; 
•  Fiscal policy, with its impact on national savings typically only partly offset by 
responses in private saving; 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, as this is only available on an annual basis, FAI data is used regularly. Although the data used in 
this paper is on GCF, there may still be issues in international comparisons. In addition, China’s GDP data 
is often considered to be underestimated, due to the limited capture of rapidly developing sectors, although 
this is true for many countries.   3
•  Pension reform, with direct short-term effects depending on the financing of the 
transition deficits and long term effects likely dominated by labor market effects; 
•  Financial liberalization, with the impact on saving of interest liberalization mixed, 
but a strong effect from expanding the supply of credit to people that had been 
credit-constrained; and 
•  Demographics, with an increase in the share of young or elderly dependents in the 
population tending to reduce private saving—by 1 percentage point (pp) for a 3.5 
percentage point increase in the young age dependency ratio, and 2 pp for a 
similar increase in the old age dependency ratio; 
as well as by external borrowing and foreign aid, and uncertainty. 
 
China’s national saving rate is high relative to international experience, even after 
controlling for these determinants of saving. Kraay (2000) found, based on a cross-
country regression using the above set of variables, that China’s high national saving 
rate—on average 37 percent between 1978 and 1995, compared to an international 
average of almost 21 percent—can be partly explained by high growth and, to a lesser 
extent, favorable demographics. However, China’s national saving rate was 10 
percentage points higher than what would be expected based on China’s characteristics. 
 
The increase in China’s household saving ratio to a high level is well-documented, and 
largely explained. Kraay (2000) presents data on saving based on the household survey 
and on wealth data. He notes that prior to the reforms, high saving “were engineered by 
state fiat”, via administered relative prices that ensured high profits in state-owned 
enterprises, which then could be directed to the state’s investment priorities. Household 
saving were low in the pre-reform area. Subsequent to the reform, public saving has 
diminished, whereas rising household incomes have made household saving newly 
prominent, “with households contributing between a quarter and half of total saving.” 
4  
 
Modigliani and Cao (2004) attribute China’s high household saving to increases in 
growth and changing demographics. Their saving data is constructed from changes in 
personal wealth using asset data.
5, 
6 Their (single country, time series) empirical analysis 
suggests that household saving has risen due to (i) the economic reforms since the end-
1970s, and the increase in growth and growth prospects they generated; as well as (ii) the 
introduction of the one-child policy at around the same time, which led to a gradual 
increase in the ratio of employment to total population and undermined the traditional 
                                                 
4 Such observations on the relative importance of household saving, and the implied saving by enterprises 
and the government, do not seem to have featured in most subsequent discussions on saving in China.  
5 They test the validity of the life cycle hypothesis (LCH) of saving on China. The LCH stresses 
intertemporal considerations in saving decisions. It asserts that the saving rate largely depends on economic 
growth (and growth prospects) and the demographic structure of a country (in particular, the relation 
between the working and the non-working population), rather than the level of income. 
6 Using data from the SYB, they calculate saving as: the change in (currency + deposits) + new issuance of 
bonds + individual investment in fixed assets. Their data indicates that the household saving rate was very 
low (around 5 percent) until the reforms started in 1978. The household saving rate subsequently rose 
rapidly, peaking at over 33 percent in 1994, after which it declined gradually to 24 percent in 2000.   4
role of the family in providing old-age support.
7 They also note that the very low saving 
rate prior to1978 calls into question “cultural” explanations of China’s high saving rate. 
 
As elaborated in this paper, analysis of sectoral data explains why the consensus set of 
factors discussed above—largely centered on households—cannot fully explain China’s 
high national saving ratio, even though the level and movement of China’s household 
saving ratio can largely be explained. This is because most of the difference in national 
saving rate between China and other countries is explained by saving outside the 
household sector: by enterprises and the government (see text table). The paper adds to 
the existing literature by exploring the sectoral patterns, focusing on the patterns of 
enterprise and government saving.  
 
 
Text table. China: Comparing Saving with Other Countries.1/
(in percent of GDP)
China United France Japan Korea Mexico
States
Total Domestic Savings 42.5 14.3 20.7 25.5 31.0 20.8
Difference China-others 28.2 21.8 17.0 11.5 21.7
due to:
Household saving 11.8 5.8 8.4 12.1 8.6
Enterprise saving 8.6 9.4 -0.5 4.1 8.3
Government saving 7.9 6.7 9.2 -4.7 4.8
Source: NBS (national accounts), via CEIC, and OECD National Accounts.
Data for China is for 2003, for Mexico for 2001, and for other countries for 2002.
1/ For details, see Table 2.  
 
 




Investment has been high throughout this period, with household and government 
investment stable at rates comparable to other countries. Enterprise investment, ranging 
between 27 and 35 percent of GDP, makes China’s investment high. 
 
Since the mid-1980s, (total) investment in China has been high.
8 As a share of GDP, it 
peaked at 43.3 percent of GDP in 1993 during the height of the previous economic cycle 
(Table 1 and Figure 1). The cyclical slowdown in investment thereafter was moderate, 
with the investment to GDP ratio reaching a low of 36.3 percent in 2000 (1999 was the 
                                                 
7 Kraay, using provincial level data, finds only little correlation between growth and saving, and positive 
correlation between saving rates and per capita income. 
8 The investment data used in this paper is annual gross capital formation from the national accounts, which 
is to be distinguished from the higher-frequency fixed asset investment data.    5
trough of the cycle in terms of GDP growth). Since then, the ratio increased to 43.8 
percent of GDP in 2003 and is estimated to have grown to an even higher share in 2004. 
 
Up until the end of the 1990s investment in inventories was substantial. According to the 
national accounts, it reached a remarkable 10 percent of GDP in 1989, and declined 
gradually thereafter. In addition to possibly indicating data problems, these data indicate 
the build up of inventories produced in the absence of market economy signals. To the 
extent that the decomposition of investment—in fixed investment and change in 
inventories—has been meaningful for the whole data period, gross fixed investment has 
been subject to a trend increase since the early 1990s (Figure 1).    
 
 
Investment by households and (direct) investment by the government has been relatively 
steady at levels comparable to other countries. Investment by households, largely 
residential, has been 5-6 percent of GDP since the early 1990s; in recent years it has been 
increasing, to an estimated 6.7 percent in 2003 (and further in 2004) (Figure 2, upper 
panel). Since the early 1990s, investment by the government has been around 3-4 percent 
of GDP. As shown below (see Table 2), household and government investment are in the 
range found for other countries. 
 
Investment by the enterprise sector distinguishes China from other countries, and 
explains most of the cyclical variation in investment. Enterprise capital formation reached 
a peak of 35.5 percent of GDP in 1993, at the height of the previous cycle. As a ratio of 
GDP it declined thereafter, to a low of 27.3 percent of GDP in 2000. During the recent 
cyclical upturn it increased to an estimated 33.8 percent of GDP in 2003. 
 
Source: NBS, and staff estimates.
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Figure 2. China: Sectoral Saving and Investment, 1990-2003 1/
Source: NBS, and staff estimates.
1/ The observations for 2002 and 2003 are estimations (see annex). They are subject to significant 
uncertainty and may not necessarily be consistent with the "below the line" data on assets.
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Saving and saving-investment balances 
 
With China’s national saving-investment balance (the current account) typically roughly 
in balance, domestic saving are the predominant financing source of investment. High 
household saving is only part of the story behind high total saving; the other part is the 
remarkably high government saving and rising enterprise saving. 
 
Households in China contribute significantly to national saving. The household saving 
rate (as a share of household disposable income) has been around 25 percent since 2000, 
having declined from around 30 percent in the mid-1990s.   
 
Data on saving rates can also be obtained from the household survey data.
9 Our 
calculations indicate that the saving rate derived from the household survey and from the 
FoF tables are broadly consistent for recent years (Figure 3), running at around 25 
percent.
 10,11 However, for the period prior to 2000, when the household survey was 
conducted using a different methodology, it is not consistent. In particular, prior to the 
mid-1990s, the overall saving rate implied by the household survey was significantly 
lower than that implied by the FoF data. On the other hand, the overall household saving 
ratio based on the FoF data is quite close to the data derived by Modigliani and Cao 
(2004).  
 
Household saving were 16 percent of GDP in 2001, and are estimated to have increased 
slightly since then (as a ratio of GDP) (Figure 2, middle panel). The balance between 
saving and investment is in principle available as net financial investment.
12 This balance 
came down from 14-16 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s to around 10 percent of GDP in 
2000-01 (Figure 2, lower panel). Based on financial assets data, it is estimated to have 
increased to almost 14 percent in 2002.
13 The bulk (over 90 percent) of households’ net 
financial investment is in bank saving deposits.  
 
Government saving is remarkably high compared to other countries, and is much higher 
than suggested by the headline fiscal data. It reached 7.5 percent of GDP in 2001 (it is 
assumed to have remained roughly at that level in 2002-03). As a result, the government 
runs a significant saving-investment surplus, which forms an additional financing source. 
Indeed, in addition to its own investment, the government finances investment via capital 
transfers to state-owned enterprises in the power, electricity, water, transport, and 
                                                 
9This survey data is available for urban and rural households separately. It is not straightforward to derive 
the saving rate for the rural sector, and different researchers have derived different rural saving rates for the 
same period.  
10 Saving for rural households is calculated by subtracting “living expenditures” from net income.     
11 The data on the total amount of household income and saving implied by the household survey data does 
not appear to be consistent with that of the flow of funds tables. Potential reasons include: (i) low coverage 
of high income households; (ii) the valuation of in-kind income; and (iii) the definition of rural income 
employed in the survey.  
12 Typically a statistical discrepancy appears when the flow information is combined with the “below the 
line” information on changes in financial assets. 
13 The observations for 2002 and 2003 are estimations (see Annex). They are subject to significant 
uncertainty and may not necessarily be consistent with the "below the line" data on assets.   8
 
other infrastructure sectors. The transfers were 6.2 percent of GDP in 2001 and are 
assumed to have remained at roughly that level in 2002-03. Investment by enterprises 
established by the government financed by capital transfers could be seen as adding to 
overall public investment. 
 
Enterprise saving from retained earnings constitutes a significant source of saving in 
China. Since 2000, enterprise saving are roughly as large as household saving. The 
saving-investment deficit of enterprises was around 14 percent in 2001, which appears to 
have remained roughly unchanged in 2002-03 (Figure 2, lower panel). Of this, 6.2 
percent of GDP was financed by capital transfers from the government. The remaining 8 
percent of GDP financing requirement was for 2 percent of GDP covered by a positive 
“statistical discrepancy”; the remainder is financed by identified external financing. The 
latter, mainly bank loans and foreign investment, is estimated to have risen to around 10 
percent of GDP in 2002-03 (see below).  
 
Based on the above data, China’s financial system has been rather effective in channeling 
financial resources to enterprise investment—an important factor behind China’s 
remarkable growth experience, and in contrast to most developing countries, where 
banks’ assets largely comprise government bonds. In this context, a judgment on the 
economic efficiency of China’s financial system would be more favorable than the more 
common judgment on financial efficiency.  
 
A closer look at financing of non-financial enterprise investment 
 
Investment of non-financial enterprises is financed mainly through four sources: own 
savings, government capital transfers, and bank loans and FDI.  
 
Own saving from retained earnings of non-financial enterprises has increased from 
around 12.5 percent of GDP in 1996 to almost 15 percent in 2001 and an estimated 18 
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Source: NBS, and staff estimates
1/ From household survey. 2/ From Flow of Funds tables.  9
percent in 2003 (Figure 4, upper panel)—driven by increasing profitability (Figure 4, 
upper panel).
14 In addition to cyclical factors, the increase in profitability is underscored 
by retrenchment and restructuring of SOEs. First, the importance of private companies 
has increased. Private companies tend to be more profitable, in the same industry. The 
share of SOEs and collectively-owned companies in total investment has declined from 
around 80 percent in the early 1990s to 53 percent in 2003 (NBS, SYB). Second, as part 
of the restructuring, many SOEs have improved their profitability: the proportion of 
SOEs making losses has fallen from 25 percent in 1999 to an estimated 8 percent in 2004, 
and centrally managed SOEs made profits of RMB 400 billion in 2004.  
 
Capital transfers from the government form a significant form of financing (Figure 4, 
middle and lower panels). The remaining external financing is largely via borrowing 
from the banking sector and, in recent years, net FDI (Text table below). Gross bank 
borrowing by enterprises—14 percent of GDP in 2002—has been much higher than net 
financing by the banking sector—3.6 percent of GDP in 2002—as the latter is moderated 
by increases in enterprise deposits. Net FDI has been 3-4 percent of GDP in recent years.  
 
The enterprise sector’s net external financing was high in the first half of the 1990s: 40 to 
60 percent of investment (Figure 4, lower panel). Financed largely via the domestic 
banking sector, it led to a rapid build up of bank loans (and M2) in that period. It was on 
a sharp downward trend until 2001, and has picked up in recent years. However, at 
around 30 percent of enterprise investment, total net external financing remains 
significantly below the high levels of the first half of the 1990s.
15 According to the FoF 
accounts, this is also true for financing via the banking sector (Text table below). 
 
Text table. External Financing of Investment of Non-financial Enterprises (in percent of GDP)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Financial Flow of Funds Accounts
Total net external financing 14.3 13.8 17.6 11.6 10.8 7.8 5.9 5.9 9.9 … …
Banking system 9.4 8.9 12.2 8.9 8.0 5.0 1.7 2.4 3.6 … …
Change in loans 18.8 16.6 22.2 15.2 13.0 11.1 10.4 9.7 13.8 … …
Change in deposits 9.5 7.7 9.9 6.3 4.9 6.2 8.7 7.3 10.2 … …
FDI (net) … … … 4.9 4.3 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.7 … …
Other (net) … … … -2.2 -1.6 -0.9 0.7 0.3 2.7 … …
Financial sector statistics
Domestic bank financing 6.8 9.3 7.4 8.2 8.9 6.1 4.2 -5.5 10.8 13.4 8.1
Change in claims 1/ 16.6 16.2 14.9 16.7 13.8 11.8 11.9 2.2 18.9 24.1 17.0
Change in deposits 2/ 9.8 6.9 7.5 8.6 4.9 5.7 7.7 7.7 8.1 10.6 8.9
Unadjusted change in claims 16.6 16.2 14.9 16.7 13.8 11.8 11.9 2.2 26.2 23.1 13.4
Sources: NBS and PBC (Flow of Funds), PBC (Monetary statistics) and author's estimates.
1/Claims to the non-financial sector (including households), from Deposit Money Banks. Attempts were made to 
adjust for the change in methodology in Jan. 2002 and write off of NPLs in Dec. 2003, Apr. 2004, and Jun. 2004.
2/Enterprise deposits, from "Sources and Uses of Credit Funds of Financial Institutions".  
                                                 
14 Based on the estimations using the national accounts. 
15 According to the NBS SYB (Table 6.3), the share of total investment (all sectors) funded by domestic 
loans rose until the early 1990s. It peaked at 27 percent in 1992. Since 1995 it has been around 20 percent.   10
 
Figure 4. China, Financing Enterprise Sector Investment, 1992-2003 1/
Source: NBS, and staff estimates.
1/ The observations for 2002 and 2003 are estimations (see annex). They are subject to significant 
uncertainty and may not necessarily be consistent with the "below the line" data on assets.
2/ Profits to costs, in industry.
3/ Including net FDI.
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Financial flows derived from the financial sector statistics (FSS) largely confirm these 
conclusions. Analysis of the FSS is complicated by methodological changes and, 
especially in recent years, recapitalization operations. Moreover, the FSS includes 
lending to households (until very recently this was not distinguished from lending to 
enterprises).
16 According to the (adjusted) FSS data, net bank financing to the non-
financial sector peaked in 2003 at 13.4 percent of GDP, and was 8 percent in 2004 (see 
Text table above). Given that credit to households has increased rapidly in recent years, 
the FSS data do also suggest that net bank financing has been a modest share of 
enterprise investment in recent years.  
 
C. Investment and Saving in International Comparison 
 
To put the data on saving and investment in international perspective, it is compared with 
data for the US, France, Japan, Korea, and Mexico (Table 2).
17 Total domestic saving 
was 16 percentage points of GDP higher in China than in the average of these five 




Household saving is substantially higher than in the comparator countries. The household 
saving rate of around 25 percent compares to 16 percent in France, the second highest.
18 
Household disposable income is, surprisingly, not much lower than in France and Japan, 
as a share of GDP, and even higher than in Korea, although it is much lower than in the 
US and Mexico. That means that household saving is also relatively high as a ratio of 
GDP. High household saving typically explains less than one-half of the difference in 
enterprise sector investment between China and the other countries.  
 
Household capital formation—predominantly residential investment—is at 6.7 percent of 
GDP in 2003 comparable in size to that in other countries. As a result, the differences in 





Gross operating surpluses—the source of retained earnings—in China are comparable to 
those in Japan, but some 9-10 percentage point of GDP higher than in the US, France, 
and Mexico. Reasons behind these differences include differences in economic structure 
and dividend policies. 
 
                                                 
16 Historically roughly comparable, in 2002 banking system net financing of the private sector according to 
the FSS was significantly higher than banking system net financing of the enterprise sector according to the 
FoF. Attempts to adjust the FSS credit data for the structural breaks reduce the gap, but it remains sizeable. 
Interestingly, the accumulated financing during 2001 and 2002 is similar.  
17 The comparison is unfortunately restricted to OECD countries, given the large difficulties obtaining the 
required data for other countries. 
18 Household saving rates in the US and Japan used to be much higher than they have been recently.   12
A key factor behind China’s high national and enterprise saving is the large relative size 
of China’s industry. Investment tends to be higher in industry than in other sectors, due to 
the inherent capital intensity of the processes, which also implies a higher share of value 
added distributed to capital. These relatively high earnings in industry—if retained—are 
the core of enterprise saving. Empirical evidence across countries confirms that the 
investment to GDP ratio tends to be higher in countries with a high share of industry in 
value added (Figure 5). Within the sample of Figure 5, China has by far the highest 
shares on both dimensions. In other words, China’s very high investment to GDP ratio is 
consistent with the importance of industry in the economy.
19 Another key factor is that 
Chinese companies pay out relatively low dividends. In particular, the SOE sector pays 
only limited dividends to the shareholder, and non to the state (to which it pays only 
taxes), although the increase in profitability in recent years has stimulated a policy 
discussion on the distribution of profits. 
 
 
Significant capital transfers to enterprises by the government—6.2 percent of GDP in 
2001, and assumed to have remained at roughly that level in 2002-03—are a unique 
                                                 
19 To the extent that value added in services is underestimated, this would decrease both ratios in the same 
proportion, leaving China’s position vis-à-vis the (imaginary) regression line roughly unchanged.  
Figure 5. China and other Countries: Share of Industry in Value Added and I/Y 
(2001, unless otherwise indicated) 1/
Sources: World Development Indicators, and, for China, NBS (Statistical Year Book).
1/ For a few countries where 2001 data were not available, data for 2000 is used.


























Japan (1990)  13
feature of China. After financing from retained earnings and capital transfers, external 
financing by the (non-financial and financial) enterprise sector was, at 8.3 percent of 




In terms of government revenues as a share of GDP, China is positioned between the US, 
Japan, and Mexico on the one hand and France and Korea on the other. Government 
consumption is relatively low in China, particularly compared to France. While there is 
little difference in direct government investment, large capital transfers to—state-
owned—enterprises distinguish China from the other countries. These transfers mean that 
government saving and government-financed investment (broadly defined) are 
substantially higher than is suggested by the headline fiscal data.  
 
D. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The above analysis has revealed the following points: 
•  Although discussions on investment and saving traditionally focus on household 
saving, China’s high saving rate is as much driven by high saving of enterprises 
and the government as by high household saving.  
•  Investment by households and direct investment by the government has been 
relatively steady at levels comparable to other countries (around 7 and 3-4 percent 
of GDP, respectively).  
•  Investment by the enterprise sector distinguishes China from other countries, and 
shows most of the variation over time. In recent years, the differential ranged 
between 11 (Korea) and 20 (US) percentage points of GDP. 
•  High enterprise investment is financed partly by a large excess of saving over 
investment of households—channeled by the banking system—and the 
government—transferred to enterprises.  
•  But with enterprise own saving having risen as profitability has improved, over 
one-half is financed by enterprise retained earnings.  
•  High government saving is a result of a policy favoring government-financed 
investment over government consumption.  
•  Reasons for relatively high saving by enterprises include a high share of capital 
intensive industry in GDP and dividend policies.   
 
These findings lead to three sets of policy-related issues:  
 
1) Financing patterns, and their policy implications 
 
Systemic risks to the banking sector stemming from China’s high investment appear to be 
smaller than suggested by many observers. It is likely that a significant share of the recent 
investment is misallocated and some bank-funded investment will never generate the 
rates of return required to avoid new NPLs. It is also likely that this has significant 
implications for China’s banking system. However, as demonstrated in this paper, the 
exposure of the banking system to the investment boom is much less than implied by the   14
overall investment numbers, and less than at the height of the previous investment 
cycle—with net external financing including net FDI financing about 30 percent of 
enterprise investment, compared to 40-60 percent in 1992-96. 
 
By the same token, high and increasing financing of enterprise investment through 
retained earnings poses its own risks and policy challenges. 
•  Large-scale re-channeling of profits back in investment by firms makes 
investment more pro-cyclical and prone to “boom and bust cycles”.  
•  Relatedly, the allocation of capital does not receive the same scrutiny as in the 
case of channeling via the financial sector, which is likely to affect its efficiency. 
For instance, although many steel companies have seen large increases in 
profitability due to high international prices, it may not be optimal to invest these 
profits in another steel factory. There is also anecdotal evidence of sub-optimal 
investment by Chinese companies in acquisitions or ventures in other sectors. 
•  These issues are of particular concern in an environment of low dividend payout 
and weak corporate governance. 
 
As profitability of SOEs has risen, the distribution of their profits has become a particular 
issue of debate. Most of the state enterprises have not paid dividends to the shareholder 
for more than a decade, despite rising profits. This may have been appropriate in times of 
restructuring. However, to improve the allocation of public resources, transparency, and 
accountability, a dividend policy for SOEs needs to be developed. Since SASAC is 
representing the state as an owner, and is not a holding company, the dividends paid out 
should directly go to the budget. If new capital investments need to be made that require 
state funding, this should be done through a budget request submitted by SASAC on 
behalf of the state enterprises. SASAC could play a role in increasing transparency of the 
management of SOEs by issuing an annual report on the performance of the SOEs under 
their management. These measures could be supported by auditing of financial accounts 
by independent auditors to ensure appropriate dividend is paid out. Making the issuance 
of capital transfers more transparent would also be appropriate. 
 
Strengthening corporate governance, moving to increasing dividend pay-out, and paying 
more scrutiny to the allocation of capital along these lines would improve the efficiency 
of capital and tend to shift the trade-off between consumption and investment more 
towards consumption.  
 
2) Short and medium-term prospects and macroeconomic policy implications 
 
The current investment to GDP ratio of 45 percent is considered higher than optimal by 
most observers. The high investment ratio is partly a cyclical phenomenon, and—given 
the importance of internal financing—investment growth can be expected to fall as profit 
growth is projected to decline, although by less than one to one. Nevertheless, the 
structural component of the investment to GDP ratio remains high, and not sustainable in 
light of long-term saving prospects (see below). The government has recently emphasized 
the need to improve the quality of growth and increase the role of consumption in the 
economy (as opposed to investment). In addition to the corporate governance and   15
dividend related measures outlined above, what other measures would further these 
objectives? 
•  A shift in government spending from investment to spending on health and 
education (“from construction of physical infrastructure to social infrastructure”) 
would directly reduce national saving and investment. The scope for such a shift 
is significant, given the high government savings. Expanding the social safety net 
is also considered by many to reduce private consumption.
20 
•  Changes in the policy framework away from the promotion of capital-intensive 
industry towards labor intensive activities including services would increase the 
share of labor income in the economy, and thereby the average propensity to 
consume. This implies adjustments in policies on prices, the financial sector, land, 
the environment, and labor movement. 
 
Investment has traditionally been correlated strongly with saving, leaving the saving-
investment balance—the external current account—small. To the extent that current 
trends towards an increasing current account surplus intensify and become problematic, 
real exchange rate appreciation would reduce the balance. Such an appreciation would 
reduce profits; it would also reduce investment, but by less than one to one. 
 
3) Longer-term saving prospects and the impact of policy 
 
Looking further ahead, in addition to the impact of possible policy adjustments as 
sketched above, several endogenous developments are likely to lead to lower overall 
saving and investment.  
 
•  An eventual moderation of economic growth and demographic changes—with 
relatively fewer workers—are likely to put significant downward pressure on 
household saving. Purely for illustration, using coefficients estimated by 
Modigliani and Cao, and judged by them to be “reasonable” (also in comparison 
with other studies), a slowdown in long-term GDP growth of 2 percentage points 
would lead to a decline in the household saving ratio of a whopping 5 percentage 
points. In addition, the projected increase in the “employment to minor” ratio 
from around 2.4 now to 2.25 (2.0) in 2030 (2075) would lead to an additional 1.5 
(4.0) percentage point decline in the household saving ratio.  
•  Pension system reform may increase national saving, depending on the degree of 
funding in the eventual system and household’s response to these policy changes. 
However, pension reform-related upward pressure is unlikely to compensate for 
the downward pressure coming from a growth slowdown and demographics.  
•  Further development of financial markets will reduce the number of credit 
constrained people and small enterprises, and the associated need for saving for 
anticipating purchases of consumer durables, life-cycle events (such as 
weddings), and investment.  
 
                                                 
20 The argument is that currently people increase saving in anticipation of health and education costs. But, 
on a macro level the payment of these costs reduces saving. Net saving would only increase under certain 
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Table 2. Sectoral Saving and Investment: International Comparison
(2002, unless otherwise indicated)
(as percent of GDP)
China United StateFrance Japan Korea Mexico
2001 2003 1/ 2001
Households
Gross primary income 62.5 80.6 71.5 65.1 59.3 80.5
Net transfers 0.7 -4.9 -6.1 0.3 0.9 1.4
Gross disposable income 63.2 75.7 65.4 65.4 60.2 81.9
private consumption 47.2 70.8 54.6 57.1 55.7 73.9
Gross savings 16.0 16.6 4.8 3/ 10.8 8.2 4.5 8.0
Gross capital formation 5.7 6.7 6.8 5.7 4.8 6.2 5.1
Other 0.6 -0.3 0.0 -1.0 0.8 0.2
Net lending 10.9 -2.3 5.2 2.4 -0.9 3.1
Corporations 2/
Gross operating surplus 15.0 10.3 9.5 19.4 14.8 10.6
gross savings 15.0 18.9 10.3 3/ 9.5 19.4 14.8 10.6
net capital transfers received 6.2 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.2
Gross capital formation 29.0 33.8 8.7 10.5 14.4 17.6 15.2
Other -0.5 0.1 -0.1 1.5 -0.4 -0.1
Net lending -8.3 1.7 -0.5 7.2 -2.7 -4.5
Government
Gross disposable income 20.9 14.4 24.2 15.5 24.7 14.7
Final consumption 13.4 15.2 23.9 17.7 12.9 12.5
Savings, gross 7.5 7.0 -0.9 0.3 -2.2 11.7 2.2
Net capital transfers -6.2 0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -1.0 1.9
Gross capital formation 3.8 3.3 2.5 3.1 4.7 5.3 1.8
Other 1.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 0.1 -2.2
Net lending -1.1 -3.2 -3.3 -7.9 5.5 0.0
Total domestic
Gross disposable income 99.1 100.4 99.1 100.3 99.6 107.2
Consumption 60.6 86.0 78.4 74.8 68.6 86.4
Gross Savings 38.5 42.5 14.3 20.7 25.5 31.0 20.8
Net capital transfers 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.5 2.1
Gross capital formation 38.5 18.0 19.3 23.9 29.1 22.2
Other 1.5 -0.3 0.0 0.9 1.6 -3.8
Net lending 1.5 -3.7 1.5 2.8 3.0 -3.1
Household saving rate 25.3 6.4 16.6 12.6 7.4 9.8
Sources: For China, data from SYB, via CIEC database. For other countries, from OECD Economic Outlook.
The original data for OECD countries on net income and net investment is transformed into gross equivalents by remo
 consumption of fixed capital--which is not known for China.
1/ Staff estimate: subject to substantial uncertainty.
2/ The total of financial and non-financial enterprises, to ensure comparability with other countries. 
 In China, in 2001, net lending of the financial sector was -2.4 percent of GDP.  19
Annex—methodological notes 
 




Total gross domestic saving (GDS)= 
  Household saving from the Flow of Funds (FoF) 
  Government saving (FoF) 
  Enterprise saving (non-financial plus financial) (FoF) 
 
 
Enterprise investment = 
Total gross domestic investment (GDI) (from national accounts; SYB, p66) -  
  Household investment (FoF) - 
  Government investment (FoF) 
 




GDS = GDP - Consumption 
Household saving (HHS) = (HHS)_1 * (Household Survey Household Saving) / 
(Household Survey Household Saving) 
 
(S-I) government is assumed to remain constant as a share of GDP 
Government saving = (S-I) government + Government investment 
 
Enterprise saving = GDS – HHS – Government saving 
 
Household investment is assumed to grow in line with “investment by individuals” from 
SYB table 6-2. 
Government investment is assumed to grow in line with “investment supported by the 
budget” from 2004 SYB p. 187. 
 
Enterprise investment = 
Total gross domestic investment (GDI) (from national accounts; SYB, p66) -  
  Household investment - Government investment 
 
(S-I) gross, domestic = GDI - GDS 
 
 
 